Rules explained07 / 10
veAiLGNS Governance
In 30 seconds
- Whitepaper plan: lock or burn AiLGNS to get veAiLGNS voting power
- Locks are returned at expiry; a burn buys permanent votes, no redemption
- More votes don't mean more emission; protocol caps still apply
What governance controls
HELIX has two spirals. HELIX-P sets the boundaries for emission, liquidity and risk; HELIX-M lets the market decide where resources go inside those boundaries. veAiLGNS is how you take part in HELIX-M. Whitepaper p. 94
AiLGNS → veAiLGNS → Vote → Gauge → Five Pools
Epochs in real time
Governance counts in epochs; 1 epoch = 7 days. Whitepaper p. 94
| Epochs | Roughly |
|---|---|
| 5 | 35 days |
| 26 | half a year |
| 52 | 1 year |
| 104 | 2 years |
| 208 | 4 years |
Source: Whitepaper p. 94
Two ways in (Dual-ve)
The principle: ordinary participants trade time for governance power; permanent governors trade a burn for permanent governance. Both paths end in veAiLGNS and vote in the same system. Whitepaper p. 95
Way one: time lock
Lock AiLGNS in the ve contract and you receive an ordinary veAiLGNS NFT. The shortest lock is 5 epochs, the longest 208. Whitepaper p. 95
Voting Power = Locked AiLGNS × Remaining Epoch ÷ 208
| Lock length | Starting voting weight |
|---|---|
| 5 epochs | about 2.40% |
| 26 epochs | 12.5% |
| 52 epochs | 25% |
| 104 epochs | 50% |
| 208 epochs | 100% |
Source: Whitepaper p. 95. With a full 208-epoch lock, 1 AiLGNS = 1 veAiLGNS.
Voting power falls linearly with the epochs remaining and reaches zero at expiry, when 100% of the locked AiLGNS is returned. Locking 100,000 AiLGNS for 208 epochs, for example, starts at 100,000 veAiLGNS, then falls through 75%, 50% and 25% to zero. Whitepaper p. 96 The cost is time and liquidity; the principal is never lost. Whitepaper p. 96
Way two: burn for permanent governance
Burn 100% of your AiLGNS and receive Permanent veAiLGNS at 1:1. The principal is gone for good and cannot be redeemed. Whitepaper p. 96
1 AiLGNS Burn = 1 Permanent veAiLGNS
- This path is bounded by the 189,000,000 AiLGNS maximum cumulative burn. Once the remaining burn capacity is used up, no new Permanent veAiLGNS can be created. Whitepaper p. 96
- An ordinary veNFT can be converted one way into a permanent veNFT during its lock (the locked AiLGNS is burned in full). There is no way back. Whitepaper p. 98
- A permanent veNFT can be transferred; the new holder inherits its current voting and economic rights. V1 has no official veNFT trading pool. Whitepaper p. 99
Both kinds count the same
Locking and burning both mint a veAiLGNS ERC-721 NFT, and one wallet can hold both kinds. Whitepaper p. 97 Permanent governance gets no bonus multiplier: Whitepaper p. 97
1 Effective veAiLGNS = 1 Vote = 1× Economic Weight
Holding veAiLGNS lets you: Whitepaper p. 98
- vote on the Gauges of the five official pools;
- receive a share of trading fees and voting rewards from the pools you vote for;
- share in 1% of the AiLGNS sell fee.
Three limits on permanent governance
"Permanent" means the right to govern never expires, not that full weight lasts forever. Whitepaper p. 99
Full weight for 208 epochs, then minus 1 point per epoch, down to 35%
Permanent veAiLGNS keeps 100% weight for the first 208 epochs after creation. After that its weight drops by 1 percentage point each epoch and stops for good at 35%. Whitepaper p. 99 Whitepaper p. 100
W = max[35%, 100% − (t − 208) × 1%] (t > 208)At most 30% of the whole system
Permanent governance may carry at most 30% of all effective voting power. Above that, the protocol scales permanent ve weight down pro rata for the period, and the excess does not count as votes. Whitepaper p. 100
Permanent Effective Governance ≤ 30%At most 2% new per epoch
New permanent governance created in one epoch may not exceed 2% of the system's effective voting power at the snapshot, nor the remaining capacity. Direct burns and ordinary-to-permanent conversions both count toward this limit. Whitepaper p. 100
New Permanent Governance ≤ min(2% × Snapshot Effective Governance, Remaining Permanent Governance Capacity)
The weekly voting cycle
Gauges run on epochs, one vote per week, always in Singapore time (SGT, UTC+8): Whitepaper p. 106
Monday 00:00: voting opens
A new epoch starts. veAiLGNS holders vote on whitelisted pools and can change their votes until the deadline. Whitepaper p. 106
Sunday 20:00: voting closes, snapshot taken
No new or changed votes; the final valid vote count is locked. Whitepaper p. 106
Sunday 20:00 to 24:00: settlement
Pool weights, eligibility, risk and emission caps are calculated. Pool i's base weight is its share of all valid votes. Whitepaper p. 106
Gᵢ = Vᵢ / VTotalNext Monday 00:00: new weights apply
The new Gauge weights take effect in the next epoch. Whitepaper p. 106
Votes are not emission
A vote expresses what you want. Actual emission is the smaller of that and the protocol's cap: Whitepaper p. 107
EᵢActual = min(EᵢVote, EᵢMax)
The cap reflects effective liquidity, real trading volume, fee contribution and risk. Whitepaper p. 107 Every Gauge also has a single-pool emission cap whose exact percentage is a governance parameter, not fixed in the whitepaper. Whitepaper p. 108
Before execution, a pool also has to pass the HealthScore gate: Whitepaper p. 108
HealthScore = 0.30L + 0.20V + 0.20F + 0.20P + 0.10S
L is real liquidity, V real trading, F fee efficiency, P price stability and S capital stability, each mapped to a 0 to 100 scale first. Votes and voting incentives do not count. Whitepaper p. 108
| HealthScore H | Maximum share of emission executed |
|---|---|
| 80 ≤ H ≤ 100 | 100% |
| 60 ≤ H < 80 | 80% |
| 40 ≤ H < 60 | 50% |
| H < 40 | 0%, new emission paused |
Source: Whitepaper p. 109. Budget cut by the HealthScore is not handed to other pools; it goes to the Insurance Reserve. Whitepaper p. 109
Buy Votes ≠ Buy Health
Voting incentives
Voting incentives (often called bribes) come in two kinds: Whitepaper p. 110
- Protocol incentives: 1% of the Turbine activation fee base plus 1% of the AiLGNS sell fee base.
- External incentives: rewards that ecosystem projects or partners add to a particular Gauge.
Voters on a Gauge share its incentives in proportion to their votes: Whitepaper p. 109
Rewardᵤ,ᵢ = Incentiveᵢ × Voteᵤ,ᵢ / TotalVoteᵢ
Incentives can buy attention, but not emission beyond the protocol's limits. Whitepaper p. 110
Governance has limits too
The whitepaper splits governance into three tiers, and a lower tier cannot override a higher one: Whitepaper p. 162
| Tier | Scope |
|---|---|
| L1 Constitution | Supply caps, ownership, basic economic principles |
| L2 DAO governance | Emission, Gauge, Router and risk parameters |
| L3 Execution | Routing, settlement, asset deployment, emergency response |
Source: Whitepaper p. 162
- The constitution fixes, among others: maximum supply 210,000,000, maximum cumulative burn 189,000,000, final minimum supply 21,000,000, irreversible POL contributions, and an LFEO share of at most 30%. Whitepaper p. 163
- High-risk parameter changes must go through a timelock, with 48 hours suggested as the baseline. Whitepaper p. 164
- Holding voting power does not give direct control over the treasury, POL or router assets. Whitepaper p. 164
- Emergency powers can only reduce risk; they cannot mint, raise emission or move user assets. Whitepaper p. 165
Governance health
The whitepaper recommends that front ends publish cumulative emission, the amount in ordinary locks, cumulative permanent burn, effective veAiLGNS, the permanent share, average remaining lock length, the number of active veNFTs and Gauge vote concentration. Whitepaper p. 101 None of these exist until the ve contracts go live.